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Abstract: Schro¨dinger’s wave function shows many aspects of a state
of incomplete knowledge or information (“bit”): (1) it is usually defined on
a space of classical configurations, (2) its generic entanglement is, therefore,
analogous to statistical correlations, and (3) it determines probabilities of
measurement outcomes. Nonetheless, quantum superpositions (such as rep-
resented by a wave function) define individual physical states (“it”). This
conceptual dilemma may have its origin in the conventional operational foun-
dation of physical concepts, successful in classical physics, but inappropriate
in quantum theory because of the existence of mutually exclusive operations
(used for the definition of concepts). In contrast, a hypothetical realism,
based on concepts that are justified only by their universal and consistent
applicability, favors the wave function as a description of (thus nonlocal)
physical reality. The (conceptually local) classical world then appears as
an illusion, facilitated by the phenomenon of decoherence, which is consis-
tently explained by the very entanglement that must dynamically arise in a
universal wave function.
1 Draft of an invited chapter for Science and Ultimate Reality, a forthcoming
book in honor of John Archibald Wheeler on the occasion of his 90th birthday
(www.templeton.org/ultimate reality).
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1 Introduction
Does Schro¨dinger’s wave function describe physical reality (“it” in John
Wheeler’s terminology [1]) or some kind of information (“bit”)? The answer
to this question must crucially depend on the definition of these terms. Is it
therefore merely a matter of words? Not quite – I feel. Inappropriate words
may be misleading, or they may even be misused in the place of lacking
explanations, while reasonably chosen terms are helpful.
A bit is usually understood as the binary unit of information, which can
be physically realized in (classical) computers, but also by neuronal states of
having fired or not. This traditional physical (in particular, thermodynam-
ical) realization of information (“bit from it”) has proved essential in order
to avoid paradoxes otherwise arising from situations related to Maxwell’s
demon. On the other hand, the concept of a bit has a typical quantum
aspect: the very word quantum refers to discreteness, while, paradoxically,
the quantum bit is represented by a continuum (the unit sphere in a two-
dimensional Hilbert space) – more similar to an analog computer. If this
quantum state describes “mere information”, how can there be real quantum
computers that are based on such superpositions of classical bits?
The problematic choice of words characterizing the nature of the wave
function (or “quantum state”, in general) seems to reflect the common un-
easiness of physicists, including the founders of quantum theory, about its
fundamental meaning. However, it may also express a certain prejudice. So
let me first recall some historical developments, most of which are described
in Max Jammer’s informative books [2], where you will also find the relevant
“classic” references that I have here omitted.
2 Historical Remarks about the Wave Function
When Schro¨dinger first invented the wave function, he was convinced that it
describes real electrons, even though the construction of his wave equation
from Hamiltonian mechanics readily led to wave mechanics on configuration
space. As far as he applied his theory to single electron states, this had
no immediate consequences. Therefore, he tried to explain the apparently
observed “corpuscles” in terms of wave packets in space (such as coherent
oscillator states). This attempt failed, but I will apply it to the configura-
tion space of bounded systems in Sect. 4. Since Schro¨dinger firmly believed
that reality must be described in space and time, he proposed nonlinear cor-
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rections to his single-electron wave equation, thus temporarily abandoning
his own many-particle wave function.
When Born later proposed his probability interpretation, he initially pos-
tulated probabilities for spontaneous transitions of a wave function into a
new one, since at this time he “was inclined to regard it [wave mechanics] as
the most profound formalism of the quantum laws” (as he later explained).
These new wave functions were either assumed to be plane waves (in a scat-
tering process), or bound states (for spontaneous transitions within atoms).
In both cases the final (and mostly also the initial) states were stationary
eigenstates of certain subsystem Hamiltonians, which thus replaced Bohr’s
semi-quantized electron orbits of the hydrogen atom.2 Born “associated”
plane waves with particle momenta according to de Broglie’s mysterious
proposal, although this had already been incorporated into wave mechanics
in the form of differential momentum operators. Only after Heisenberg had
formulated his uncertainty relations did Pauli introduce the general interpre-
tation of the wave function as a “probability amplitude” for particle positions
or momenta (or functions thereof) – cf. [3]. It thus seemed to resemble a sta-
tistical distribution representing incomplete knowledge (although not about
position and momentum). This would allow the entanglement contained in a
many-particle wave function to be understood as statistical correlations, and
the reduction of the wave function as a “normal increase of information”.
However, Pauli concluded (correctly, I think, although this has also been
debated) that the potentially observed classical properties (particle position
or momentum) cannot be merely unknown. Instead, he later insisted [4]
that “the appearance of a definite position of an electron during an obser-
vation is a creation outside the laws of nature” (my translation and italics).
Heisenberg had even claimed that “the particle trajectory is created by our
act of observing it”. In accordance with Born’s original ideas (and also
with von Neumann’s orthodox interpretation), such spontaneous “events”
are thus understood dynamically (in contrast to a mere increase of infor-
mation), while the process of observation or measurement is not further
dynamically analyzed.
According to Heisenberg and the early Niels Bohr, these individual events
2 The idea of probabilistically changing (collapsing) wave functions was generalized and
formalized as applying to measurements by von Neumann in what Wigner later called the
“orthodox interpretation” of quantum mechanics. (By this term he did not mean the
Copenhagen interpretation.) Its historical roots may explain why von Neumann regarded
quantum jumps as the first kind of dynamics, while calling the Schro¨dinger equation a
second “Eingriff” (intervention).
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occurred in the atoms, but this assumption had soon to be abandoned be-
cause of the existence of larger quantum systems. Bohr later placed them
into the irreversible detection process. Others (such as London and Bauer
[5] or Wigner [6]) suggested that the ultimate events occur in the observer,
or that the “Heisenberg cut”, where the probability interpretation is applied
in the observational chain between observer and observed, is quite arbitrary.
Ulfbeck and Aage Bohr [7] recently wrote that “the click in the counter oc-
curs out of the blue, and without an event in the source itself as a precursor
to the click”. Note that there would then be no particle or other real object
any more that dynamically connects the source with the counter! These
authors add that simultaneously with the occurrence of the click the wave
function “loses its meaning”. This is indeed the way the wave function is of-
ten used – though not whenever the “particle” is measured repeatedly (such
as when giving rise to a track in a bubble chamber). Even if it is absorbed
when being measured for the first time, the state thereafter is described by
a state vector that represents the corresponding vacuum (which is evidently
an individually meaningful quantum state).
The picture that spontaneous events are real, while the wave function
merely describes their deterministically evolving probabilities (as Born for-
mulated it) became general quantum folklore. It could represent an objec-
tive description if these events were consistently described by a fundamental
stochastic process “in nature” – for example in terms of stochastic electron
trajectories. A physical state at time t0 would then incompletely determine
that at another time t1, say. The former could be said to contain “incomplete
information” about the latter in an objective dynamical sense (in contrast
to Heisenberg’s concept of actual “human knowledge”, or information that
is processed in a computer). This indeterminism would be described by the
spreading of a probability distribution, representing the decay of “objective
information”, contained in an initial state, about the later state. Unfor-
tunately, this dynamical interpretation fails. For example, it would be in
conflict with Wheeler’s delayed choice experiments [8]. Therefore, there have
been attempts to reduce the concept of trajectories to that of “consistent
histories” (partially defined trajectories) [9]. Roughly, these histories con-
sist of successions of discrete stochastic events that occur in situations being
equivalent to the aforementioned “counters”. However, what circumstances
let a physical system qualify as a counter in this sense?
Can something that affects real events, or that keeps solid bodies from
collapsing, itself be unreal? In principle, this is indeed a matter of definition.
For example, electromagnetic fields were originally regarded as abstract aux-
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iliary concepts, merely useful to calculate forces between the (“really exist-
ing”) charged elements of matter. Bohm’s theory demonstrates that electron
trajectories can be consistently assumed to exist, and even to be determin-
istic under the guidance of a global wave function. Their unpredictability
would be due to unknown (and unknowable) initial conditions. John Bell
[10] argued that the assumed global wave function would then have to be
regarded as real, too: it “kicks” the electron (while it is not being kicked
back in this theory). Evidently this wave function cannot merely represent
a statistical ensemble, although it dynamically determines an ensemble of
potential events (of which but one is supposed to become real in each case –
note the presumed direction of time!).
In particular, any entanglement of the wave function is transformed into
statistical correlations whenever (local) events occur without being observed.
Even when Schro¨dinger [11] later called entanglement the greatest mystery
of quantum theory, he used the insufficient phrase “probability relations in
separated systems” in the title to his important paper. In the same year,
Einstein, Podolski and Rosen concluded, also by using entangled states, that
quantum theory must be incomplete. The importance of entanglement for
the (real!) binding energy of the Helium atom was well known by then,
total angular momentum eigenstates were known to require superpositions
of products of subsystem states, while von Neumann, in his book, had dis-
cussed the specific entanglement that arises from quantum measurements.
Nonetheless, none of these great physicists was ready to dismiss the condi-
tion that reality must be local (that is, defined in space and time). It is this
requirement that led Niels Bohr to abandon microscopic reality completely
(while he preserved this concept for the classical realm of events).
3 The Reality of Superpositions
However, there seems to be more to the wave function than its statistical and
dynamical aspects. Dirac’s general kinematical concept of “quantum states”
(described by his ket vectors in Hilbert space) is based on the superposition
principle. It requires, for example, that the superposition of spin-up and
spin-down defines a new individual physical state, and does not just lead
to interference fringes in the statistics of certain events. For every such
spin superposition of a neutron, say, there exists a certain orientation of a
Stern-Gerlach device, such that the path of the neutron can be predicted
with certainty (to use an argument from Einstein, Podolski and Rosen).
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This spinor would not be correctly described as a vector with two unknown
components. Other spin components have to be created (outside the laws of
nature according to Pauli) during measurements with another orientation
of the Stern-Gerlach magnet.
Superpositions of a neutron and a proton in the isotopic spin formalism
are formally analogous to spin, although the SU(2) symmetry is dynami-
cally broken in this case. As these superpositions do not occur in nature
as free nucleons (they may form quasi-particles within nuclei), the validity
of the superposition principle has been restricted by postulating a “charge
superselection rule”. We can now explain the non-occurrence of these and
many other conceivable but never observed superpositions by means of en-
virenmental decoherence, while neutral particles, such as K mesons and their
antiparticles, or various kinds of neutrinos, can be superposed to form new
bosons or fermions, respectively, with novel individual and observable prop-
erties.
Two-state superpositions in space can be formed from partial waves
which escape from two slits of a screen. Since these partial waves can hardly
be exactly re-focussed on to the same point, we have to rely on statistical
interference experiments (using the probability interpretation) to demon-
strate the existence of this superposition of single-particle wave functions.
(The outcome of the required series of events, such as sets of spots on a
photographic plate, have quantum mechanically to be described by tensor
products of local states describing such spots – not by ensembles.) General
one-particle wave functions can themselves be understood as superpositions
of all possible “particle” positions (space points). They define “real” phys-
ical properties, such as energy, momentum, or angular momentum, only as
a nonlocal whole.
Superpositions of different particle numbers form another important ap-
plication of this basic principle, important for characterizing “field” states.
If free fields are treated as continua of coupled oscillators, boson numbers
appear as the corresponding equidistant excitation modes. Their coherent
superpositions (which first appeared in Schro¨dinger’s attempt to describe
corpuscles as wave packets) may represent quasi-classical fields. Conversely,
quantum superpositions of classical fields define field functionals, that is,
wave functions over a configurations space of classical field amplitudes.
These field functionals (generalized wave functions) were used by Dyson
[12] to derive path integrals and Feynman diagrams for perturbation theory
of QED. All particle lines in these diagrams are no more than an intuitive
short hand notation for plane waves appearing in the integrals that are ac-
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tually used. The misinterpretation of the wave function as a probability
distribution for classical configurations (from which a subensemble can be
“picked out” by an increase of information) is often carried over to the path
integral. In particular, quantum cosmologists are using the uncertainty re-
lations to justify an ensemble of initial states (an initial indeterminacy) for
presumed trajectories of the universe. Everett’s relative state interpretation
(based on the assumption of a universal wave function) is then easily misun-
derstood as a many-classical-worlds interpretation. However, Heisenberg’s
uncertainty relations are defined with respect to classical variables. They
hold for given quantum states, and do not require the latters’ (initial, in this
case) indeterminacy as well. Ensembles of quantum states would again have
to be created from an initial superposition (outside the laws or by means
of new laws), while apparent ensembles of cosmic fluctuations may form by
means of decoherence [13].
Superpositions of different states that are generated from one asymmet-
ric state by applying a symmetry group (rotations, for example) are par-
ticularly useful. They define irreducible representations (eigenstates of the
corresponding Casimir operators) as new individual physical states, which
give rise to various kinds of families of states or (real) “particles”.
During the recent decades, more and more superpositions have been con-
firmed to exist by clever experimentalists. We have learned about SQUIDs,
mesoscopic Schro¨dinger cats, Bose condensates, and even superpositions of a
macroscopic current running in opposite directions (very different from two
currents canceling each other). Microscopic elements of quantum computers
(which simultaneously perform different calculations in one superposition)
have been successfully designed. All these superpositions may be (or must
be) observed as individual physical states. Hence, their components “ex-
ist” simultaneously. As long as no unpredictable events have occurred, they
do not form ensembles of possible states which would represent incomplete
information about the true state.
A typical example for the appearance of probabilistic quantum events is
the decay of an unstable state by means of tunneling through a potential
barrier. The decay products (which in quantum cosmology may even be
whole universes) are here assumed to enter existence, or to leave the poten-
tial well, at a certain though unpredictable time. That this description is
not generally applicable has been demonstrated by experiments in cavities
[14], where different decay times may interfere with one another. Many nar-
row wave packets, approximately representing definite decay times, would
indeed have to be added coherently in order to form unitarily evolving wave
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functions which may decay exponentially (according to a complex energy)
in a large but restricted spacetime region. This dynamical description by
means of the Schro¨dinger equation requires furthermore that exponential
tails of an exact energy eigenstate need time to form. So it excludes su-
perluminal effects that would result (though with very small probability) if
exact eigenstates were created in discontinuous quantum jumps [15].
The conventional quantization rules, which are applied in situations
where a corresponding classical theory is known or postulated, define the
wave function ψ(q) as a continuum of coefficients in superpositions
∫
ψ(q)|q〉
of all classical configurations q.3 With the exception of single-particle states,
this prodedure leads directly to the infamous nonlocal states. Their nonlo-
cality is very different from a (classical) extension in space, which would
quantum mechanically be described by a product of local states. Only su-
perpositions of such products of subsystem states may be nonlocal in the
quantum mechanical sense. In order to prevent reality from being nonlocal,
superpositions were therefore usually regarded as states of information –
in contrast to the conclusion arrived at above. Even hypothetical “baby”
or “bubble universes” are defined to be somewhere else in space – in con-
trast to the “many worlds” of quantum theory. However, Bell’s inequality
– and even more directly so its generalizations by Greenberger, Horne and
Zeilinger [16] or Hardy [17] – have allowed experimentalists to demonstrate
by operational means that reality is nonlocal. So why not simply accept the
reality of the wave function?
As mentioned above, there are two, apparently unrelated, aspects which
seem to support an interpretation of the wave function as a state of “infor-
mation”: the classical configuration space, which replaces normal space as
the “stage of dynamics” (and thus leads to quantum nonlocality), and the
probability interpretation. Therefore, this picture and terminology appear
quite appropriate for practical purposes. I am using it myself – although
preferentially in quotation marks whenever questions of interpretation are
discussed.
3 Permutation symmetries and quantum statistics demonstrate that the correct clas-
sical states to be quantized are always spatial fields – not the apparent particles which
appear as a consequence of decoherence. This has recently been nicely illustrated by vari-
ous experiments with Bose condensates. The equidistant energy levels of free field modes
(oscillators) mimic particle numbers, and – if robust under decoherence – give rise to the
non-relativistic approximation by means of “N-particle wave functions”. This conclusion
eliminates any need for a “second quantization”, while particle indices become redun-
dant, similar to gauge variables. There are no particles even before quantization (while a
fundamental unified theory may not be based on any classical theory at all)!
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While the general superposition principle, from which nonlocality is de-
rived, requires nonlocal states (that is, a kinematical nonlocality), most
physicists seem to regard as conceivable only a dynamical nonlocality (such
as Einstein’s spooky action at a distance). The latter would even have to in-
clude superluminal actions. In contrast, nonlocal entanglement must already
“exist” before any crucially related local but spatially separated events oc-
cur. For example, in proposed so-called quantum teleportation experiments,
a nonlocal state has to be carefully prepared initially – so nothing has to
be ported any more. After this preparation, the relevant state “exists but is
not there” [18]. Or in similar words: the physical state is ou topos (at no
place), although it is not utopic according to quantum theory. If nonlocality
is thus readily described by the formalism (just taken seriously), how about
the probability interpretation?
4 The Roˆle of Decoherence
Most nonlocal superpositions discussed in the literature describe controllable
(or usable) entanglement. This is the reason why they are being investigated.
In an operationalist approach, this usable part is often exclusively defined
as entanglement, while uncontrollable entanglement is regarded as “distor-
tion” or “noise”. However, if the Schro¨dinger equation is assumed to be
universally valid, the wave function must contain far more entanglement (or
“quantum correlations”) than can ever be used [19]. In contrast to entan-
glement, uncontrollable noise, such as phases fluctuating in time, would not
destroy (or rather, dislocalize) an individual superposition. It may at most
wash out an interference pattern in the statistics of many events (cf. [20]).
Therefore, entanglement, which leads to decoherence in bounded systems
even for an individual global quantum state, has to be strictly distinguished
from phase averaging either in ensembles of events, or resulting from a fluc-
tuating Hamiltonian (“dephasing”).
John von Neumann discussed the entanglement that arises when a quan-
tum system is measured by an appropriate device. It leads to the conse-
quence that the relative phases which characterize a superposition are now
neither in the object nor in the apparatus, but only in their (shared) to-
tal state. These phases cannot affect measurements performed at one or
the other of these two subsystems any more. The latter are then conve-
niently described by their reduced density matrices, which can be formally
represented by ensembles of subsystem wave functions with certain formal
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probabilities. If the interaction dynamics between system and apparatus is
(according to von Neumann) reasonably chosen, the resulting density ma-
trix of the apparatus by itself can be represented by an ensemble of slightly
overlapping wave packets which describe different pointer positions with pre-
cisely Born’s probabilities. Does it therefore explain the required ensemble
of measurement outcomes? That is, have the quantum jumps into these new
wave functions (the unpredictable events) already occurred according to von
Neumann’s unitary interaction?
Clearly not. Von Neumann’s model interaction, which leads to this en-
tanglement, can in principle be reversed in order to reproduce a local super-
position that depends on the initial phase relation. For a microscopic pointer
variable this can be experimentally confirmed. For this reason, d’Espagnat
[21] distinguished conceptually between proper mixtures (which describe en-
sembles) and improper mixtures (which are defined to describe entanglement
with an external system). This difference is of utmost importance when the
problem of measurement is being discussed. The density matrix by itself is
a formal tool that is sufficient for all practical purposes which presume the
probability interpretation and neglect the possibility of local phase revivals
(recoherence). Measurements by microscopic pointers can be regarded as
“virtual measurements” (leading to “virtual decoherence”) – in the sense of
virtual particle emission or virtual excitation. Similarly, scattering “events”
cannot be treated probabilistically as far as phase relations, described by
the scattering matrix, remain relevant or usable. Nothing can be assumed
to have irreversibly happened in virtual measurements (as it would be re-
quired for real events).
The concept of a reduced density matrix obtains its justification from
the fact that all potential measurements are local, that is, described by local
interactions with a local apparatus. Classically, dynamical locality means
that an object can directly affect the state of another one only if it is at the
same place. However, we have seen that quantum states are at no place, in
general. So what does dynamical locality mean in quantum theory?
This locality (which, in particular, is a prerequisite for quantum field
theory) is based on an important structure that goes beyond the mere
Hilbert space structure of quantum theory. It requires (1) that there is
a Hilbert space basis consisting of local states (usually a “classical configu-
ration space”), and (2) that the Hamiltonian is a sum or spatial integral over
corresponding local operators. (The first condition may require the inclu-
sion of gauge degrees of freedom.) For example, the configuration space of
a fundamental quantum field theory is expected to consist of the totality of
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certain classical field configurations on three- (or more-) dimensional space,
while its Hamiltonian is an integral over products of these field operators
and their derivatives. This form warrants dynamical locality (in relativistic
and nonrelativistic form) in spite of the nonlocal kinematics of the generic
quantum states.
So let us come back to the question why events and measurement results
appear actual rather than virtual. In order to answer it we must first un-
derstand the difference between reversible and irreversible (uncontrollable)
entanglement. For this purpose we have to take into account the realis-
tic environment of a quantum system. We may then convince ourselves
by means of explicit estimates that a macroscopic pointer cannot avoid be-
coming strongly entangled with its environment through an uncontrollable
avalanche of interactions, while the quantum state of a microscopic variable
remains almost unaffected in most cases.
This situation has been studied in much detail in the theory of decoher-
ence4 [20, 22] (while many important applications still remain to be inves-
tigated – for example in chemistry). It turns out that all phase relations
between macroscopically different pointer positions become irreversibly non-
local in this way for all practical purposes and within very short times –
similar to the statistical correlations that would classically arise from Boltz-
mann’s molecular collisions. These chaotic correlations as well as the quan-
tum phases become inaccessible and irrelevant for the future evolution, while
they still exist according to the assumed deterministic dynamics. If the wave
function did “lose meaning”, we would not be able to derive decoherence
from universal quantum dynamics.
The asymmetry in time of this dissipation of correlations requires spe-
cial initial conditions for the state of the universe – in quantum theory for
its wave function [23]. However, in contrast to classical statistical corre-
lations, the arising entanglement (“quantum correlation”) affects the indi-
vidual state: it represents a formal “plus” rather than an “or” that would
characterize an ensemble.
Two conclusions have to be drawn at this point. Decoherence occurs
according to the reversable dynamical laws (the Schro¨dinger equation) by
means of an in practice irreversible process, and precisely where events seem
to occur, but even this success does not lead to an ensemble representing in-
complete information. The improper mixture does not become a proper one.
4The concept of decoherence became known and popular through the “causal” chain
Wigner-Wheeler-Zurek.
11
We can neither unambiguously choose a specific ensemble to “represent” the
reduced density matrix, nor even the subsystem to which the latter belongs.
From a fundamental point of view it would, therefore, be misleading in
a twofold way to regard the entangled wave function as representing “quan-
tum information”. This terminology suggests incorrectly (1) the presence
of a (local) reality that is incompletely described or predicted by the wave
function, and (2) the irrelevance of environmental decoherence for the mea-
surement process (even though it has been experimentally confirmed [24]).
A further dynamical consequence of decoherence is essential for the
pragmatic characterization of the observed classical physical world. Con-
sider a two-state system with states |L > and |R > which are “continu-
ally measured” by their environment, and assume that they have exactly
the same diagonal elements in a density matrix. Then this density ma-
trix would be diagonal in any basis after complete decoherence. While a
very small deviation from this degeneracy would soon resolve this dead-
lock, an exact equality could arise from an exactly symmetric initial state,
|± >= (|R > ±|L >)/√2. However, if we then measured |R >, say, a sec-
ond measurement would confirm this result, while a measurement of |+ > (if
possible) would give |+ > or |− > with equal probabilities when repeated
after a short decoherence time. It is the “robustness” of a certain basis
under decoherence (a “predictability sieve” in Zurek’s language) that gives
rise to its classical appearance. In the case of a measurement apparatus it
is then called a “pointer basis”.
This problem of degenerate probabilities remains present also for quasi-
degenerate continua of states. For sufficiently massive particles (or macro-
scopic pointer variables), narrow wave packets may be robust even though
they do not form an orthogonal basis that diagonalizes the density matrix.
Their shape and size may change under decoherence in spite of their robust-
ness. Collective variables (such as the amplitude of a surface vibration) are
adiabatically “felt” (or “measured”) by the individual particles. For micro-
scopic systems this would represent a mere dressing of the collective mode.
(My original work on decoherence was indeed influenced by John Wheeler’s
work on collective nuclear vibrations by means of generator coordinates [25].)
However, decoherence must be irreversible. Even the germs of all cosmic in-
homogeneities were irreversibly “created” by the power of decoherence in
breaking the initial homogeneity during early inflation [13]. In other cases,
such as a gas under normal conditions, localized molecules seem to exist as a
consequence of decoherence into narrow wave packets, while the latters’ lack-
ing robustness prevents the formation of extended individual trajectories.
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Nonetheless, something is still missing in the theory in order to arrive
at definite events or outcomes of measurements, since the global superpo-
sition must still exist according to the Schro¨dinger equation. The most
conventional way out of this dilemma would be to postulate an appropriate
collapse of the wave function as a fundamental modification of unitary dy-
namics. Several models have been proposed in the literature (cf. [26]). They
(quite unnecessarily) attempt to mimic precisely the observed environmen-
tal decoherence. However, since superpositions have now been confirmed
far in the macroscopic realm, a Heisenberg cut for the application of the
collapse may be placed anywhere between the counter (where decoherence
first occurs in the observational chain) and the observer. The definition of
subsystems in the intervening medium is entirely arbitrary, while the diag-
onalization of their reduced density matrices (the choice of their “pointer
bases”) may be convenient, but is actually irrelevant for this purpose. An
individual observer may even “solipsistically” assume the border line to ex-
ist in the observational chain after another human observer (who is usually
referred to as “Wigner’s friend”, since Eugene Wigner first discussed this
situation in the roˆle of the final observer).
It would in fact not help very much to postulate a collapse to occur
somewhere in the counter. The physical systems which carry the information
from the counter to the observer, including his sensorium and even his brain,
must all be described by quantum mechanics. Quantum theory applies ev-
erywhere, even where decoherence allows it to be approximately replaced by
stochastic dynamics in terms of quasi-classical concepts (“consistent histo-
ries”). In an important paper, Max Tegmark [27] recently estimated that
neuronal networks and even smaller subsystems of the brain are strongly
affected by decoherence. While this result does allow (or even requires)
probabilistic quantum effects, it excludes extended controllable superposi-
tions in the brain, which might represent some kind of quantum computing.
However, postulating a probability interpretation at this point would elimi-
nate the need for postulating it anywhere else in the observational chain. It
is the (local) classical world that seems to be an illusion!
Nobody knows as yet where precisely (and in fact whether) consciousness
may be located as the “ultimate observer system”. Without any novel em-
pirical evidence there is no way to decide where a collapse really occurs, or
whether we have indeed to assume a superposition of many classical worlds
– including “many minds” [28] for each observer – in accordance with a
universal Schro¨dinger equation. It is sufficient for all practical purposes to
know that, due to the irreversibility of decoherence, these different minds
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are dynamically autonomous (independent of each other) after an observa-
tion has been completed. Therefore, Tegmark’s quasi-digitalization of the
neuronal system (similar to the |R,L > system discussed above) may even
allow us to define this subjective Everett branching by means of the diagonal
form of the observer subsystem density matrix.
A genuine collapse (in the counter, for example) would produce an un-
predictable result (described by one component of the wave function that
existed prior to the collapse). The state of ignorance after a collapse with
unobserved outcome is, therefore, described by the ensemble of all these
components with corresponding probabilities. In order to reduce this en-
semble by an increase of information, the observer has to interact with the
detector in a quasi-classical process of observation. In the many-minds in-
terpretation, in contrast, there is an objective process of decoherence that
does not produce an ensemble. (The reduced density matrix resulting from
decoherence can be treated for all practical purposes as though it represented
one. This explains the apparently observed collapse of the wave function.)
Even the superposition of the resulting many minds describes one quan-
tum state of the universe. Only from a subjective (though objectivizable by
entanglement) point of view would there be a transition into one of these
many “minds” (without any intermediary ensemble in this case). This in-
terpretation is reminiscent of Anaxagoras’ doctrine, proposed to separate
Anaximander’s apeiron (a state of complete symmetry): “The things that
are in a single world are not parted from one another, not cut away with
an axe, neither the warm from the cold nor the cold from the warm. When
Mind began to set things in motion, separation took place from each thing
that was being moved, and all that Mind moved was separated.” (Quoted
from [2], p. 482). Although, according to this quantum description, the
roˆle of “Mind” remains that of a passive (though essential) epi-phenomenon
(that can never be explained in terms of physical conepts), we will see in the
next section how Anaxagoras’ “doctrine” would even apply to the concepts
of motion and time themselves.
In this specific sense one might introduce the terminology (though not as
an explanation) that the global wave function represents “quantum informa-
tion”. While decoherence transforms the formal “plus” of a superposition
into an effective “and” (an apparent ensemble of new wave functions), this
“and” becomes an “or” only with respect to a subjective observer. An addi-
tional assumption has still to be made in order to justify Born’s probabilities
(which are meaningful to an individual mind in the form of frequencies in se-
ries of measurements): one has to assume that “our” (quantum correlated)
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minds are located in a component of the universal wave function with non-
negligible norm [29]. (Note that this is a probable assumption only after it
has been made.) It is even conceivable that observers may not have been able
to evolve at all in other branches, where Born’s rules would not hold [30].
5 The Wheeler-DeWitt Wave Function
The essential lesson of decoherence is that the whole universe must be
strongly entangled. This is an unavoidable consequence of quantum dy-
namics under realistic assumptions. In principle, we would have to know
the whole wave function of the universe in order to make local predictions.
Fortunately, there are useful local approximations, and most things may be
neglected in most applications that are relevant for us local observers. (Very
few systems, such as the hydrogen atom, are sufficiently closed and simple
to allow precision tests of the theory itself.)
For example, gravity seems to be negligible in most situations, but Ein-
stein’s metric tensor defines space and time – concepts which are always rel-
evant. Erich Joos [31] first argued that the quantized metric field is strongly
decohered by matter, and may therefore usually be treated classically. How-
ever, some aspects of quantum gravity are essential from a fundamental and
cosmological point of view.
General relativity (or any unified theory containing it) is invariant under
reparametrization of the (physically meaningless) time coordinate t that is
used to describe the dynamics of the metric tensor. This invariance requires
trajectories (in the corresponding configuration space) for which the Hamil-
tonian vanishes. This Hamiltonian constraint, H = 0, can thus classically
be understood as a conserved initial condition (a conserved “law of the in-
stant”) for the time-dependent states. Upon quantization it assumes the
form of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (WDWE),
HΨ = 0 ,
as the ultimate Schro¨dinger equation [32]. This wave function Ψ depends
on all variables of the universe (matter and geometry, or any unified fields
instead). Since now ∂tΨ = 0, the static constraint is all that remains of
dynamics. While the classical law of the instant is compatible with time
dependent states (trajectories), time is entirely lost on a fundamental level
according to the WDWE. For a wave function that describes reality, this
result cannot be regarded as just formal. “Time is not primordial!” [8]
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Dynamical aspects are still present, however, since the WDW wave func-
tion Ψ describes entanglement between all variables of the universe, includ-
ing those representing appropriate clocks. Time dependence is thus replaced
by quantum correlations [33]. Among these variables is the spatial metric
(“three-geometry”), which defines time as a many-fingered controller of mo-
tion for matter [34] (another deep conceptual insight of John Wheeler), just
as Newton’s time controls motion in an absolute sense.
The general solution of this WDWE requires cosmic boundary conditions
in its configuration space. They may not appear very relevant for “us”, since
Ψ describes the superposition of “many worlds”. Surprisingly, for Friedmann
type universes, this static equation is of hyperbolic type after gauge degrees
of freedom have been removed: the boundary value problem becomes an
initial value problem with respect to the cosmic expansion parameter a [35].
For appropriate boundary conditions at a = 0, this allows one to deduce a
cosmic arrow of time (identical with that of cosmic expansion) [23]. How-
ever, in the absence of external time t, there is neither any justification for
interpreting the wave function of the whole universe in a classically forbid-
den region as describing a tunneling process (or the probability for an event),
nor to distinguish between its expansion and contraction according to the
phase of e±ia (see [36], for example). In contrast, an α-particle is found
with an outgoing wave after a metastable nuclear state has been prepared
(in external time). Similar arguments as for a tunneling process apply to a
classical “slow roll” of the universe along a descending potential well [37].
Since the Wheeler-DeWitt wave function represents a superposition of
all three-geometries (entangled with matter), it does not describe quasi-
classical histories (defined as one-dimensional successions of states, or in-
stants). Kiefer was able to show [38] that such histories (which define space-
times) can be approximately recovered by means of decoherence along WKB
trajectories that arise according to a Born-Oppenheimer approximation with
respect to the Planck mass. This leads to an effective time-dependent
Schro¨dinger equation along each WKB trajectory in superspace (Wheeler’s
term for the configuration space of three-geometries). Complex branch wave
functions emerge thereby from the real WDW wave function by an intrinsic
breaking of the symmetry of the WDWE under complex conjugation (cf.
Sect. 9.6 of [20]). Each WKB trajectory then describes a whole (further
branching) Everett universe for matter.
Claus Kiefer and I have been discussing the problem of timelessness
with Julian Barbour (who wrote a popular book [39] about it) since the
mid-eighties. Although we agree with him that time can only have emerged
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as an approximate concept from a fundamental timeless quantum world
that is described by the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, our initial approach and
even our present understandings differ. While Barbour regards a classical
general-relativistic world as time-less, Kiefer and I prefer the interpreta-
tion that timelessness is a specific quantum aspect (since there are not even
parametrizable trajectories in quantum theory). In classical general rela-
tivity, only absolute time (a preferred time parameter) is missing, while the
concept of one-dimensional successions of states remains valid.
In particular, Barbour regards the classical configuration space (in con-
tradistinction to the corresponding momentum space or to phase space) as
a space of global actualities or “Nows”. Presuming that time does not exist
(on the basis that there is no absolute time), he then concludes that trajec-
tories (of which but one would be real in conventional classical description)
must be replaced by the multi-dimensional continuum of all potential Nows
(that he calls “Platonia”). He assumes this continuum to be “dynamically”
controlled by the WDWE. After furthermore presuming a probability inter-
pretation of the WDW wave function for his global Nows (in what may be
regarded as a Bohm theory without trajectories), he is able to show along
the lines of Mott’s theory of α-particle tracks (and by using Kiefer’s results)
that classical configurations which are considerably “off-track” (and thus
without memory of an apparent history) are extremely improbable. Thus
come memories without a history.
One might say that according to this interpretation the Wheeler-DeWitt
wave function is a multidimensional generalization of one-dimensional time
[23]. Julian Barbour does not agree with this terminology, since he insists on
the complete absence of time (although this may be a matter of words). I do
not like this picture too much for other reasons, since I feel that global Nows
are not required, and that the Hamiltonian symmetry between configuration
space and momentum space is only dynamically – not conceptually – broken
(by dynamical locality). Nonetheless, this is a neat and novel idea that I
feel is worth being mentioned on this occasion.
6 That ITsy BITsy Wave Function
Reality became a problem in quantum theory when physicists desperately
wanted to understand whether the electron or the photon “really” is a par-
ticle or a wave (in space). This quest aimed at no more than a conceptually
consistent description that may have to be guessed, but would then be con-
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firmed by all experiments. It was dismissed in the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion according to the program of complementarity (which has therefore also
been called a “non-concept”). I have here neither argued for particles nor for
spatial waves, but instead for Everett’s (nonlocal) wave function(al). It may
serve as a consistent and universal kinematical concept, and in this sense
as a description of reality (once supported also by John Wheeler [40]). The
price may appear high: a vast multitude of separately observed (and thus,
whith one exception, unobservable to us) quasi-classical universes in one
huge superposition. However, similar to Everett I have here no more than
extrapolated those concepts which are successfully used by quantum physi-
cists. If this extrapolation is valid, the price would turn into an enormous
dividend of grown knowledge about an otherwise hidden reality.
The concept of reality has alternatively been based on operationalism.
Its elements are then defined by means of operations (performed by what
Wheeler called “observer-participators” [8]), while these operations are them-
selves described in non-technical “every-day” terms in space and time. In
classical physics, this approach led successfully to physical concepts which
proved consistently applicable. An example is the electric field, which was
defined by means of the force on (real or hypothetical) test particles. The
required operational means (apparata) could afterwards be self-consistently
described by using these new concepts themselves (partial reductionism).
This approach fails in quantum theory, since, for example, quantum fields
would be strongly affected (decohered) by test particles.
The investigation of quantum objects thus required various, mutually
incompatible, operational means. This led to incompatible (or “comple-
mentary”) concepts, seemingly in conflict with a microscopic reality. Niels
Bohr’s ingenuity allowed him to recognize this situation very early. Unfor-
tunately, his enormous influence (together with the dogma that the concept
of reality must be confined to objects in space and time) seems to have
prevented his contemporaries to explain it in terms of a more general (non-
local) concept that is successfully used but not directly accessible by means
of operations: the universal wave function. In terms of this hypothetical
reality we may now understand why certain (“classical”) properties are ro-
bust even when being observed, while microscopic objects may interact with
mutually exclusive quasi-classical devices under the control of clever exper-
imentalists. However, this does not mean that these quantum objects have
to be fundamentally described by varying and incompatible concepts (waves
or particles, for example).
If “it” (reality) is understood in the operationalist sense, while the wave
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function is regarded as “bit” (incomplete knowledge about the outcome of
potential operations), then one or the other kind of it may indeed emerge
from bit – depending on the “very conditions” of the operational situation.
I expect that this will remain the pragmatic language for phyicists to de-
scribe their experiments for some time to come. However, if it is required
to be described in terms of not necessarily operationally accessible but in-
stead universally valid concepts, then the wave function remains as the only
available candidate for it. In this case, bit (information as a dynamical func-
tional form, as usual) may emerge from it, provided an appropriate (though
as yet incompletely defined) version of a psycho-physical parallelism is pos-
tulated in terms of this nonlocal it. If quantum theory appears as a “smokey
dragon” [8], the dragon itself may now be recognized as a universal wave
function, partially veiled to us local beings by the “smoke” of its inherent
entanglement.
However you turn it: In the Beginning Was the Wave Function. We may
have to declare victory of the Schro¨dinger over the Heisenberg picture.
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